The Siberian/Chinese Invasion of the Russian Republic

The Siberian/Chinese Invasion of the Russian Republic was a failed offensive manuever by the Chinese Army and the Siberian military to seize and occupy the lands claimed by the self-declared Russian Republic. Launched on July 5th, the operation intended to flood across the Republic and occupy it before winter snowfall blanketed western Siberia and to establish Siberian control to the Ural mountains, from which it was hoped after a brief period they'd be capable of operating in conjunction with the Communes of Saint Petersburg to complete the Revolution in Russia.

The operation came to a failure though, as it failed to reach its alloted time-tables and quickly ran afoul of Russian winters, as well as unaccounted for local resistance. The endemic set-backs through the later part of the invasion and the concentration on the urban centers in the southern portion of the nation lead to large criticism by the Chinese and Russian authorities about the ability of General Tien Shen, who was considered to have been largely outflanked despite utilizing better armor and higher numbers. Initial inteligence reports were also questioned in regards to grossly undervaluing the troop strength of the Russian Republic.

The fierce battles over control of southern cities such as Omsk pulled much of the force's alloted manpower. Though the damage to the city was immense, the year-long siege only produced a Republican victory when Tien Shen was forced to withdraw, despite attempts to outflank the Russians and succesful attempts to take smaller objectives.

Causes for the Invasion
Since its formal inception at the collapse of the Russian state in 1971 the communist regime ruling the Russian Far-East had aspirations in reclaiming the Russian State under the principle of them being the People's Inheritors of Russia, a shared mission with the Western Communes under Radek. The Siberian power - vested in the Greater Russian People's Party - had seized a large amount of the Russian Far East with considerable backing from China. For the Chinese, the Siberian Republic was seen as an acceptable replacement to the Russian state which was seen as a dangerous bourgeoisie rival. To the Chinese, a friendly government ruling over Russia, or holding enough land to create a sustainable buffer state between them and the Russian west was considered an acceptable mission in regards to its Free Asia policy.

Siberia prior had made a successful campaign against the rival Siberian faction in control of Central Siberia five years prior in a swift invasion of the fledgling state. Their accomplishments here was enough to breed a sense of confidence for their programs of the future.

For the Republic, their goals politically ran counter-intuitive or against the mission of the Siberians. Seen as another bourgeoisie state the Siberians felt they needed little applicable reason to not invade. Especially given the young politics of the state as it slowly emerged through the real politic and force of its early leadership, ultimately being less of the Republic that it branded itself as.

After several years of consolidation and incorporating new assets into the national infrastructure the invasion was launched in July of 1971.

July 5th movements
The operation went into full swing on July 5th with Chinese army leading the spear-head against the Russian forces. Clearing through initial resistance - militia or otherwise - the armored divisions managed to clear a path into Omsk in which the infantry and artillery divisions followed. On reaching the countryside around the city, the Chinese divisions met with local resistance as the local military garrison rallied to hold them off, stalling the armor with anti-tank before they could breach the city proper.

Russian infantry and light armor engaged the Chinese forced throughout the day as mixed Russian and Chinese regiments arrived to fill in and provide ample support to the armored columns and push Republican forced back. Several of the villages outside of the city were occupied as front-line command centers. Kalachinsk served as forward command and the base of deployment for the heavy artillery and mortars of the Chinese army (as is the repeated case in the Second Invasion of the Russian Republic).

Siege of Omsk
As ample infantry and air support arrived at the field the coalition forces pressed forward onto Omsk, breaching its limits on July 8th and entering urban combat soon after. The delay in seizing the city however gave time for the Republic to deploy reinforcements on the region who entered into Omsk earlier that morning and prepared flanking positions to the north where they carried out raids or attacks of Chinese positions as they besieged the city.

Positions were shelled regularly as air support radioed in Republican positions. Large swathes of the eastern city was reduced to rubble in attempts to reduce the combat effectiveness of defending forces, though opening up Chinese positions to Russian bombing. Increasing asymmetry in the northern front complicated the problem of fighting the Republicans effectively and the first battle of the war drained into winter, forcing a slowing down as the ill-equip Chinese forces were forced to deal with a compounding series of new challenges beyond their initial schedule.

Asymmetry
A credited issue to the failure of the invasion was the uncontrolled asymmetry which was allowed to evolve on its own with no effort to control it. Although the complexity of the front in areas allowed for many large Chinese units to move unhindered and take several large towns, it proved difficult to properly supply and man these positions as Russian forces did like-wise or responded on their own. In all, many units were forced to route, especially in poorly managed radio communications that failed to produce even the most basic sense of direction.

What little success this produced was largely in the field of data and information gathering as observation tracked the movement of a number of Russian units and missions ran by the top-secret, Chinese GHH program located a number of undocumented Russian installations believed to be a source of considerable activity. Though the initial front was unable to reaching these installations, they were documented. Several small-scale bombing missions were had on them with mixed success.

In Omsk and the occupied cities themselves winter made combat difficult and bogged down many patrols as snow-storms blinded the attacking forces or snowed many units into isolated blocks with the loss of the proper urban infrastructure. The chaotic lines as well had many holes used by the Republican army to resupply the city.

Support
The costly nature of the invasion and its failures to meet its objectives by spring lead to wide-spread loss of public support in even the most supportive regions of Siberia in the far-east. Couple with congressional failure to organize and maintain faith in the operation forced the hand of Siberian secretary Nikolov Nitski to begin orders to wind down the invasion under the presumption that they could carve and hold a smaller area which they'd operate as they re-examined their efforts.

Russian VX
Tensions only grew and the ability to consolidate power when the the Republic announced their posession of the toxic nerve agent known as VX. The move attracted considerable attention from the Chinese political class which had largely ignored the war, leaving it to the army as their own issue. Seeing the mismanagement and the potential for a crisis, Hou Sai Tang ordered Tien Shen withdrawn and demanded the Republic to cease their threats.

Peace
The Republic ultimately conceded when the Chinese built up their military presence in their bases in Turkestan to the west. Meeting in Yekaterinburg, the Siberians agreed to cease hostilities and to withdraw. But from China the Republic was forced to agree to wide-spread inspections to affirm the validity of their final claim they did not hold VX. As well, Republican president Dimitriov was taken into Chinese custody in his threats to use VX.

In addition, Nikolov agreed to partake in diplomatic talks later that year to come to an agreement on a peaceful merger of the two nations. Unbeknownst to the Republicans, he later made private deals with the Chinese to secede Primoski Krai to the Chinese. The talks later failed, and dwindled so long that like the Republic, Siberia suffered a period of deteroration; though the Republic's condition dwindles ever worse.

Basis for the Second Invasion
See: Renewed Chinese Missions in Russia

By 1980 the Siberian state restored itself to a state similar to its previous. With that, so did its interest in restoring Russia with it as its one true successor. And as before, the Siberians lacked the proper supplies to attack the Republic, which sense then had grown larger; if too large for its own stability. Instead of appointing a novice general to command, the Chinese military sent General Hue Wen - commander of the Manchurian People's Army - to command and oversee planning, prep, and execution of the new invasion. As opposed to his discharged colleague, Hue Wen produced a cohesive invasion plan, accounting for the risks and elements learned from the last invasion, utilizing an amalgamation of intel gathered from the large-scale inspections and war-time aerial scouting of western Siberia.